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Introduction 
 
In Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will, David Hodgson sets out on an ambitious 
metaphysical project that purports to explain the existence of free will and moral 
responsibility as arising out of consciousness and human rationality. Hodgson describes his 
view as a libertarian, incompatibilist theory of free will, in which there are multiple possible 
futures and moral agents are undetermined, yet rational. 
 
Contents 
 
Hodgson’s book is divided into twelve chapters. Throughout each chapter, he clearly lays 
out a series of core assertions, which are collected in a list at the end of each chapter. This 
feature is remarkably reader friendly, although these assertions vary wildly in importance 
and complexity.  Still, readers are never more than a few pages from a core assertion with 
which to orient them to Hodgson’s overall project. 
 
The first chapter consists of a Cartesian-style skeptical inquiry, in which he concludes that 
his most foundational belief is that “Conscious experiences occur.” (12) In the second 
chapter, Hodgson lays out a realist theory of truth, in which true sentences are said to 
accurately describe reality. Chapters three through six outline Hodgson’s theory of 
rationality, in which he argues that rational decision making is not determined by 
computational laws, or laws of nature. In chapters seven and eight Hodgson argues that his 
theory is consistent with contemporary science. Chapters nine through eleven consist of 
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Hodgson’s account of free will and moral responsibility, and their role in the legal system. 
In the final chapter, Hodgson reflects upon the implications his metaphysical theory has for 
how we view the world. 
 
Review 
 
In Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will, Hodgson purports to solve the enduring free 
will problem; which is best understood in terms of competing views of free will and moral 
responsibility. Compatibilists contend that free will and moral responsibility are consistent 
with universal causal determinism, the theory that the actual past, coupled with the laws of 
nature, determine a single possible future. In contrast, incompatibilists contend that free will 
and moral responsibility require indeterminism, the theory that given the actual past and 
laws of nature, there are multiple possible futures. Furthermore, most incompatibilists 
believe that it wouldn’t make sense to hold people morally accountable for their choices if 
they are arbitrarily determined by chance. The challenge for the incompatibilist is to show 
how agents could act for reasons, without either being determined to act because of those 
reasons, or choosing between them arbitrarily. At first glance, Hodgson’s account promises 
to do just this; but upon closer inspection Hodgson’s view is actually a compatibilist view, 
although a fairly bizarre one. 
 
A persistent problem in this work is that Hodgson fails to distinguish between two distinct 
concepts of “indeterminism” he uses. The first sense of “indeterminism” concerns how  
consciousnesses are not rules governed, while the second is the more traditional 
indeterminism, where given the actual state of affairs, there are multiple possible futures. 
(81, 121) The next two paragraphs offer a more complete picture of these competing 
conceptions of indeterminism. 
 
For Hodgson, reality is divided into two categories; conscious experience and the physical 
world, where the physical world is objective and governed by natural or computational 
laws, while conscious experience is subjective (by this, Hodgson means only that our 
consciousness is a subject that experiences; not that our conscious experiences are arbitrary 
or unrepresentative of the external world). Hodgson argues that our consciousness is not 
governed by laws because laws can only link a limited number of features, while a 
conscious mind is capable of experiencing multiple features “all-at-once,” and react to this 
“gestalt” as a whole. (81) As such, our consciousness cannot be reduced to physical states; 
but our choices are made when our consciousness acts with our subconscious physical brain 
to form a decision. This decision, he contends, is not causally determined, because the 
consciousness is not governed by natural laws, and is in this sense “indeterministic.” This 
account of indeterminism differs radically from the kind incompatibilists require; and is 
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consistent with compatibilist theories. The best way to understand this is to approach 
Hodgson’s model in a Skinnerian behaviorist manner: On Hodgsons view, two distinct 
individuals with identical physical states subjected to the same piece of music would react 
in the same manner. Hodgson contends that this manner is indeterministic because it is 
partially brought about by each agent’s conscious experience of the music as a whole and 
laws are incapable of addressing the many facets of such an experience; however what he 
calls consciousness is consistent with a fixed, single future where different consciousnesses 
react to distinct, but qualitatively similar experiential gestalts in the same manner. 
 
Hodgson is committed to the position that there are multiple possible futures, but this 
commitment is the result of his faith in science, in particular quantum mechanics, rather 
than in human cognition. This indeterminism does not contribute to an agent’s decision-
making process, either in terms of physical brain-states or our consciousness. In this regard, 
although Hodgson believes that our choices are undetermined (by causal laws) and there are 
multiple possible futures, our choices are not means by which we access different possible 
futures. 
 
One of the more interesting concepts Hodgson introduces in this book is what he calls 
“plausible reasoning.” (37)  Hodgson defines rationality as encompassing any number of 
features that human beings use in their deliberative process. (26) In most cases, he contends, 
the laws of reason are insufficient to cause our choices. Our consciousness “fills in” these 
gaps in reason, allowing us to pick and choose which reasons we find persuasive and act on 
them. This is plausible reasoning. Although the process of choosing reasons in this manner 
is indeterministic (in the first sense) for Hodgson, it is deterministic in the sense relevant to 
compatibilists – the same input will always result in the same output. Even if this manner 
were indeterministic in the broader sense relevant to incompatibilists, it is no less arbitrary. 
Although plausible reasoning might be arbitrary in this sense, for Hodgson it counts as 
rational because it is a necessary part of our deliberative process. 
 
Incompatibilists are often criticized for holding an incoherent account of moral agency; 
moral agents are said to require alternate possibilities; this is to say that they and must have 
the ability to act in an undetermined manner for non-arbitrarily selected reasons. At first 
glance, Hodgson’s account seems to satisfy this traditional incompatibilist account; but does 
so by redefining success. For Hodgson, agents can be said to act rationally, and rationally 
select the reasons they act upon – but only because “rationality” has been redefined to 
describe any method human being actually reason in. Our deliberative process is 
indeterministic only insofar as it is not explicable in terms of Hodgsonian laws, but these 
laws seem bizarrely impotent and insufficient to govern a complex physical world of the 
kind we believe we live in. Finally, for Hodgson there are multiple possible futures; but this 
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is ultimately an empirical claim, not a prerequisite for moral responsibility. As such, 
Hodgson’s account is best understood as a bizarre form of compatibilism. As a compatibilist 
theory, it is difficult to tell if Hodgson’s account does anything more than muddle 
commonsense conceptions of determinism, indeterminism, and rationality that 
compatibilists are normally well suited to take at face value. 
 
